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Abstract 
Many developing countries would like to increase the share of modern or formal 
sectors in their employment.  One way to accomplish this goal may be to encourage the 
entrance of foreign firms.  They are typically relatively large, with high productivity and 
good  access  to  foreign  markets,  and  might  therefore  be  better  at  creating  jobs  than 
domestic firms are. However, previous research on the issue has been limited by the 
paucity of long data sets for firm operations. 
We examine employment growth in Indonesia in a large panel of plants between 
1975 and 2005, and especially in plants taken over by foreign owners from domestic 
ones. Employment growth is relatively high in foreign-owned establishments, although 
foreign firms own relatively large domestic plants, which in general grow more slowly 
than smaller plants. For plants that change the nationality of ownership during our period, 
we find a strong effect of shifts from domestic to foreign ownership in raising the growth 
rate  of  employment,  but  no  significant  effects  of  shifts  from  foreign  to  domestic 
ownership.  
 The  faster  growth  of  employment  in  the  foreign-owned  plants  in  general  is 
concentrated in the takeovers, especially in the year of acquisition. Foreign takeover of a 
domestically-owned  plant,  on  average,  brings  a  large  immediate  expansion  of 
employment. 
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1. Introduction 
  One of the possible consequences of inward foreign direct investments (FDI) for 
developing countries, and one that is of particular interest to their governments, is the 
extent to which the investment creates new jobs in the industrial, or “modern” sector, to 
help in the transformation of the economies.  Lewis’ (1954) notion of a need to move 
people out of agriculture and into the modern sector is still a goal for many developing 
countries (Asian Development Bank, 2005). There are several ways in which inward FDI 
might play this role. 
  There is considerable evidence that foreign-owned firms are relatively efficient, 
and may for that reason have access to foreign markets that would not be within the reach 
of domestically-owned firms.  They may also have wider contacts and knowledge of 
world  markets  and  better  access  to  financing,  all  advantages  that  should  provide  a 
positive effect on their employment.
1 On the other side, the foreign -owned firms may 
compete  with  domestically -owned  firms  for  some  markets,  so  that  the  losses  of 
employment by domestically-owned firms may offset, to some extent, the gains in the 
foreign-owned firms.  In addition, the foreign-owned firms may tend to be more capital-
intensive than  domestically-owned firms,  and more intensive in the use of imported 
intermediate products,  so that an increase in their sales adds less to employment than 
would a corresponding increase by domestically-owned firms. 
In this paper, we use Indonesian manufacturing plant level data between 1975 and 
2005 to analyze the effect of FDI on employment. We first compare rates of employment 
                                                 
1 See Lipsey (2004) for a survey on host country effects of FDI. For studies on FDI in Indonesia see e.g. 
Blomström and Sjöholm (1999), Lipsey and Sjöholm (2004), Takii (2005), Blalock and Gertler (2008), and 
Arnold and Javorcik (2009). For studies on multinational firms and employment in high income countries, 
see Bandick and Karpaty (2007), and Hakkala et al. (2008).   3 
growth  in  foreign-owned  and  domestically-owned  plants.    Second,  we  examine 
employment growth after foreign acquisitions of domestically-owned establishment and 
domestic acquisitions of foreign-owned establishments. These observations hold constant 
the identity of the individual establishment, although not its characteristics. If foreign 
ownership provides superior technology or better access to world markets, establishments 
should tend to raise their employment after foreign takeovers.  If these advantages require 
continued foreign ownership, there may be employment losses when a foreign-owned 
establishment is acquired by a domestic firm.  On the other hand, if the technological or 
other gains from foreign ownership are retained in the establishment, its level and growth 
of employment may continue after a domestic acquisition. 
Acquisitions  may  not  be  random  with  respect  to  the  prospects  for  the  target 
establishment. In order to control for unobservable firm characteristics that could involve 
selection bias in foreign acquisitions, we combine propensity score matching techniques 
with the more general difference in differences estimator. To test whether any effects are 
due to  changes between foreign and domestic ownership, we examine both domestically-
owned  establishments  that  are  acquired  by  foreign  owners  and  foreign-owned 
establishments that are acquired by domestic owners.   
 
2. Foreign plants in Indonesian manufacturing 
  We analyze Indonesian manufacturing data supplied by the Indonesian Statistical 
Office  for  the  period,  1975  to  2005  for  all  manufacturing  plants  with  more  than  20   4 
employees.  A  plant  identification  code  enables  us  to  construct  a  panel  and  follow 
individual plants over time. 
Employment  in  manufacturing  plants  with  more  than  20  employees  increased 
from fewer than seven hundred thousand in 1975 to about 4 million in 1997 and later 
years (Figure 1). That growth was driven mainly by a strong increase in employment in 
domestically-owned private plants, which remained close to three quarters of all plants 
during  the  entire  period.  Foreign  establishments  have  played  an  increasing  role  in 
Indonesian manufacturing employment.  Plants with some foreign ownership, accounting 
for less than 10 percent of manufacturing employment in 1975, employed around 20 
percent in 1997, at the time of the Asian crisis. After that the share declined slightly, but 
then recovered to 20 percent again in 2005. The share of government-owned plants, much 
larger than that of foreign plants in 1975, shrank steadily after the late 1980s, and was 
only 5 percent of manufacturing employment in 2005.  
The industry sectors and the ownership groups differed in some important aspects.  
One  extreme  difference  was  in  size:  government-owned  plants  were  far  larger  than 
domestically-owned private plants, five times as large, on average, in 1975 and still over 
three times as large in 2005.  They were much larger also within the industry groups, with 
a  few  exceptions  (Table  1).  Foreign-owned  plants  were  also  much  larger  than 
domestically-owned private plants, about three times as large in both beginning and end 
years.  In 2005, the foreign-owned plants were larger than domestically-owned private 
plants in every group.  The size disparity may be an element in the frequency and success 
of takeovers.   5 
To  the  extent  that  we  can  associate  the  share  of  blue-collar  workers  in  total 
employment with the average skill level in an establishment, it appears that foreign firms 
tended to use a slightly higher skill labor force than private domestic firms in the same 
industry.  Government-owned plants operated with the lowest proportions of blue-collar 
workers  consistently  across  almost  all  industries.  Only  government-owned  plants 
employed  work  forces  made  up  to  the  extent  of  30  percent  or  more  of  white-collar 
workers, almost 40 percent in a few cases, while private domestic plants employed more 
than 20 percent white-collar workers in only one industry group in one year. 
The changes in the share of Indonesian manufacturing employment in foreign-
owned  plants,  discussed  above,  came  about  in  several  different  ways.    One  was  
takeovers of domestically-owned plants by foreign firms, offset by takeovers of foreign-
owned plants by Indonesian owners. Another was the establishment of new plants by 
foreign  owners  and  the  demise  of  existing  plants  A  third  source  of  change  was  any 
differences  in  average  rates  of  growth  in  employment  between  locally-owned  and 
foreign-owned plants. 
These different sources of growth of employment in foreign owned plants are 
shown in Table 2. Up through 1989, foreign takeovers accounted for a large part of total 
growth in employment in foreign-owned manufacturing establishments, but they were 
offset by declines in such employment from local takeovers of foreign-owned plants.  
After  1989,  the  foreign  takeovers  added  more  to  the  foreign-owned  share  than  the 
domestic takeovers took away.  
The path of takeover activity between foreign and domestic owners, in terms of 
numbers of takeovers, is described by Figure 2.  The numbers of takeovers had been   6 
fairly similar in the two directions until the 1990s, but since then, foreign takeovers have 
been more numerous, except in 1997, during the Asian crisis.   However, the net effect of 
foreign and domestic takeovers was less important as a source of employment growth in 
foreign-owned establishments than the combination of the establishment of new foreign-
owned plants and their more rapid growth. 
 
3. Econometric approach 
We  begin  the  econometric  analysis  by  treating  growth  in  employment  as  a 
function of various plant characteristics: 
 
it R j ind
t i w it it it it
ε dummy Reg dummy Ind β
dummy Year Ownership β λPlant α L L L Δ
 
      
 
   
_ _             
   _   ln ln ln 1 1


,  (1)  
where i indexes firms, and t indexes year.  
The variables included in the model are: 
L:   Employment. 
Plant:   A  vector  of  lagged  plant  characteristics,  i.e.  plant  size  measured  by 
employment, energy intensity (quantity of energy per employee), which 
is  a  proxy  for  physical  capital  intensity,  and  inputs  of  intermediate 
goods, defined as raw materials, fuel, and lubricants, per employee  
i Ownership :   Ownership  dummy  variables  indicating  three  ownership  categories, 
private  domestically-owned,  private  foreign-owned,  and  government-
owned.   7 
Dummy variables for year, industry (two-digit ISIC), and region (provinces aggregated 
into 5 regions).  
The plant control variables might be endogenously determined and we try to control for 
this  possibility  by  lagging  them  one  period.  Hence,  we  assume  that  growth  in 
employment between period t and t+1 is caused by, for instance, the size in period t. 
Labor productivity, as measured by value-added per employee, was included in some 
experiments, but it added nothing to the equation and was dropped. 
Ownership is  divided into foreign,  government-domestic and private-domestic. 
Foreign establishments are defined as plants with any foreign ownership. Government-
owned  establishments  are  defined  as  plants  without  foreign  ownership  but  with  any 
government (central or local) ownership. The remaining plants are defined as private-
domestically owned. In some later estimations, ownership is instead a dummy on foreign 
acquisitions  of  domestically  owned  plants  and  a  dummy  on  domestic  acquisitions  of 
foreign owned plants. The universe we examine in the estimations on takeovers includes 
all firms except those that experience multiple ownership changes.  Firm-specific effects 
and time dummies are included in the regressions. The ownership dummy variables are 
one when an ownership change is recorded and thereafter. 
Acquisitions  may not  be random  with  respect  to factors that determine  future 
growth.    This  means  that  estimates  on  employment  growth  may  be  biased  if  non-
randomness is not taken into account. We therefore use propensity score matching (PSM) 
combined with the more general difference-in-differences technique, as suggested by e.g. 
Blundell and Costa Dias (2005), Heyman et al. (2007), and Arnold and Javorcik (2009).    8 
The matching procedure aims to find a group of non-acquired plants that display the same 
characteristics as the group of acquired plants. For foreign takeovers, the control group is 
taken from the plants that are always domestic, while for domestic takeovers, the control 
group is taken from the plants that are always foreign. Matching techniques are used to 
construct  samples  of  non-acquired  plants  that  are  twins  to  acquired  plants  and,  thus, 
approximate the non-observed counterfactual event: what would have happened to these 
plants if they had not been acquired. 
The probability of takeover, the propensity score, is obtained by fitting a probit 
model.  The  model  specification  is  similar  to  the  OLS  regressions  above  but  adds 
variables such as plant age and log productivity, lagged one year. Table A1 shows that 
young and large domestically-owned plants with high productivity and energy intensity 
are relatively likely to be acquired by foreign owners. By contrast, foreign-owned plants 
that are small, with low productivity and energy intensity, are relatively likely to be taken 
over by domestic owners. Hence, foreigners acquire what seem to be relatively good 
domestic  plants  (cherry  picking)  and  domestic  actors  acquire  relatively  poor  foreign 
owned plants. By constructing a matched sample based on the probability of takeover, the 
selection problem is reduced.  
We employ a nearest neighbor matching technique with replacement to construct 
our matched sample of plants. In case of foreign takeover, each domestic plant that would 
be acquired later by foreign owners is matched to an always domestic plant that has the 
closest propensity score. The same approach is used for domestic takeovers. Moreover, 
the matched treated and control units are from the same year and same industry.   9 
Of the 1,037 foreign takeovers, 390 are in the treatment group.  The loss in the 
number of foreign takeovers from the treatment group is mainly due to the fact that there 
are 475 foreign takeovers reported to have taken place in the second year after the plant 
starts operation, and thus there is no employment growth in the pre-acquisition period to 
compare with. Another 108 takeovers are dropped because there are some missing values 
in the observed characteristics used to estimate propensity scores. Of 652 domestic 
takeovers, 291 are included in the treatment group. 233 domestic takeovers are dropped 
because they are reported to have taken place in the second year of operation, and another 
128 domestic takeovers are dropped because of missing values. It is a cause for concern 
that so many takeovers are dropped because they are reported to take place in the second 
year of existence. However, the regression analyses were carried out on samples with and 
without takeover in the second year, and the results were robust.  
Tests are conducted to make sure that our matched sample is balanced in the sense 
that the treated and control units have similar pre takeover values on the control variables 
(Tables A2 and A3). In the matched sample, the differences in means  of the control 
variables are not significant between treated and control units. 
Having obtained a control group of firms, we combine propensity score matching 
with  the  difference-in-differences  estimator  to  estimate  the  impact  of  acquisitions  on 
employment. The difference-in-differences approach compares employment growth for 
the treated group of acquired plants with the relevant control group of plants that are not 
acquired.  








post         (2)   10 
L is employment growth rates (difference in log employment) or, in some estimations, 
employment itself. Post refers to the post-acquisition period, which could be in the year 
of acquisition, or one year after, or the average of the whole post-acquisition periods. Pre 
refers  to  the  period  before  acquisition.  Similarly  it  could  be  one  year  before  the 
acquisition, or the average of the all the years before acquisition. The difference in the 
second parenthesis corrects the selection bias in the pre-acquisition period.  
 
4. Econometric results 
5.1. Determinants of the rate of plant employment growth 
We  start  in  Table  3  with  simple  OLS  analyses  on  the  whole  universe  of 
manufacturing  plants.  The  equations  include  the  ownership  variables,  Foreign  and 
Government, and the reference group is therefore domestic-private firms. The coefficient 
for  Foreign  is  positive  and  statistically  significant,  indicating  a  rate  of  growth  in 
employment  6  percent  higher  in  foreign-owned  than  in  domestic-private  plants.  The 
coefficient for government is statistically significant, but only 2 percent. 
The equation includes plant characteristics that might affect employment growth. 
Large firms have comparatively low growth rates, as has been found in previous studies 
(e.g. Karlsson  et  al.,  2008). Plants  that are more energy intensive and  use more raw 
materials are associated with higher employment growth rates in general. 
The last two columns examine growth of the numbers of blue- and white- collar 
workers. The positive effect on the employment of blue-collar workers is substantially   11 
larger than the effect on white-collar workers: 6 percent compared to 3.6 percent. The 
effect of government ownership is also higher for blue- than for white- collar workers but 
both effects are small compared to the effect of foreign ownership. Finally, the negative 
effect  of  size  and  the  positive  effect  of  input  per  employee  on  employment  growth 
primarily affect blue-collar workers, as is also the case for the positive effect from energy 
intensity. 
The  evidence  of  Table  3  is  that  foreign-owned  plants  tend  to  increase  their 
employment 6 percent faster than private domestically-owned plants over the years of 
their existence, given the other characteristics of the plants. 
 
5.2. Foreign takeovers and employment growth 
  In Table 4, we separate the effects of foreign takeovers from those of foreign 
ownership in general. The OLS estimate of the effect of foreign ownership aside from 
foreign acquisition effects is about 5 per cent per year faster growth in employment.  The 
effect of foreign acquisition is subsequent growth in employment at a rate 9 per cent 
faster than in domestic plants.   
  The fixed effect approach looks at growth in employment within a firm before 
and after the acquisition and removes the time-constant unobserved plant characteristics 
that  could  confound  the  explanation  of  acquisition  effects.  Only  firms  that  change 
ownership are included. Fixed effect estimates raise the foreign acquisition effect to 11 
percent. The effect on blue-collar workers is about twice as large as the effect on white-
collar  workers.  Moreover,  the  results  indicate  that  domestic  acquisition  reduces  the   12 
subsequent rate of employment growth, although only the effect on white-collar workers 
is statistically significant.  
The  effect  of  FDI  on  employment  might  differ  between  trade  regimes 
(Balasubramanyam  et  al.,  1996).    FDI  flows  drawn  to  a  developing  country  to  take 
advantage  of  cheaper  labor  costs  would  respond  to  an  export-oriented  policy  by 
expansion. By contrast, FDI induced by import substitution policy is limited by the size 
and income level of the host-country market.  
To test for the possible impact of differences in trade regimes, suggested above, 
we divide Indonesia’s history since 1975 into three periods, which we think of as an 
import substitution period 1975-1985; a trade liberalization period 1986-1996; and the 
crisis and post-crisis period 1997-2005.
2 The results, shown in Table 5, support the idea 
that the effects of FDI on host countries are affected by trade regimes. During the trade 
liberalization period 1986-1996, the employment growth rate effect of foreign acquisition 
was as high as 19 percent.
3  In contrast, foreign takeovers had no significant effects on 
employment growth rates during the earlier, import substitution, period 1975-1985. 
 
5.3. Matched comparisons of domestic and foreign takeovers 
We test these results for possible biases from the selectivity of acquisitions by 
using propensity score matching. The results are shown in Table 6. Foreign takeovers 
raise the growth rate of employment by 10 percent on average during the acquisition and 
post-acquisition  period,  after  correcting  for  the  pre-acquisition  differences  between 
                                                 
2 See Aswicahyono et al. (1996; 2008), and Aswicahyono and Hill (2002) for discussions on Indonesia’s 
policy regimes, and for similar distinctions in different periods. 
3     1901 . 0 1 1901 . 1 100 1 exp
174 . 0          13 
acquired and non-acquired plants. This is similar to the fixed effect estimate. Domestic 
takeovers, according to the matched comparison, do not affect employment growth rates. 
While  the  employment  growth  rates  in  foreign  takeovers  do  not  differ 
significantly from those of plants remaining domestically-owned in the first and second 
years  after  the  takeover,  the  impact  of  the  foreign  takeovers  continues,  because  the 
acquired plants grow so much in the year of takeover that the same growth rate after 
takeover implies a considerably larger absolute growth in employment in the following 
years in the acquired plants, relative to domestic plants, as is shown in Table 7. There are 
no similar effects in absolute terms from domestic acquisitions of foreign plants.  The 
concentration  of  employment  growth  rate  change  in  the  year  of  acquisition  and  the 
consequent carryover of absolute employment growth into the following years are vividly 
illustrated by Figures 3 and 4.  
One implication of this concentration in the year of acquisition is that the usual 
assumption  that  “Greenfield”  investment  adds  resources  to  the  recipient  country,  but 
acquisitions only change ownership is wrong.  Acquisitions can be associated with very 
substantial  additions  to  resources,  quite  apart  from  any  gains  that  might  arise  from 
transfers from less-skilled to more-skilled management. 
 
5. Conclusions 
  Foreign owned Indonesian manufacturing plants grew more rapidly in 
employment than plants that remained in Indonesian ownership during 1975-2005, given 
the other characteristics of the plants.  The more rapid growth is confirmed by several 
tests of the data including a close examination of takeovers of locally-owned plants by   14 
foreigners and of foreign-owned plants by local owners.  Employment in plants that were 
foreign-owned throughout our period grew, on average, about 5 percent faster than in 
plants that were always domestically owned. Plants that were acquired by foreigners 
grew about 10 percent faster according to fixed effect estimates. Considering that foreign 
plants are on average considerably larger than domestic plants, the difference in the 
number of jobs created was large. 
  The propensity score matching consistently confirmed the advantages of foreign 
ownership for employment growth.  There is also some indication that the employment 
growth effects of foreign ownership are sensitive to host country trade policy, with 
liberalization encouraging the expansion of employment through foreign takeover. 
There were indications in several tests that there was a decline of employment growth in 
shifts from foreign to domestic ownership, although that result is not statistically 
significant.  
  Most of the employment effects of foreign takeovers took place in the year of 
takeover. There was relatively little effect on growth rates in the following years, but the 
absolute additions to employment in the years after takeover were larger than they would 
have been under continued local ownership because the base was much larger.     
The negative or insignificant effect of domestic acquisition on foreign-owned 
plants, as in the fixed effects estimate and the difference-in-differences estimate from a 
matched sample, shows that the advantages of foreign-owned plants that accounted for 
more rapid growth required continued foreign ownership.  They are apparently lost if the 
plant returns to domestic ownership.    15 
One possible implication of the concentration of growth in the year of acquisition 
is that the distinction between “Greenfield investments” and acquisitions is not as sharp 
as is often assumed.  Many of the acquisitions apparently involve major changes in the 
size and possibly other dimensions of the target firms.    16 
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Figure 4. Employment Levels Before and After Acquisition
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Table 1. Average number of employees per establishment and the share of blue-
collar workers, 1975 and 2005 
    Private-domestic  Gov’t-domestic  Foreign 







































































































































































* - Fewer than 5 observations   22 
 
Table 2. Employment Growth in Foreign-owned Manufacturing Establishments in 
Indonesia, by Source of Growth, 1975-2005 
Year  Foreign   Foreign Takeover  Domestic Takeover  Other
a 
1975~1979  49,379  21,190  10,765  38,954 
1980~1984  9,197  18,463  27,435  18,169 
1985~1989  30,615  47,488  47,997  31,124 
1990~1994  384,856  182,561  87,909  290,204 
1995~1999  135,759  216,927  181,210  100,042 
2000~2005  108,500  300,782  110,081  -82,201 
Note: 
a). New establishments minus disappearances, firm growth after takeover, and 
miscellaneous changes. 
   23 
 
Table 3. Ownership and Growth in Employment, OLS estimations 

































































Note: a constant is included in all estimations. Energy, Inputs and Productivity are in log 
form. T- values based on robust (cluster at plant level) standard deviations are in 
parentheses.  
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% 
level.   24 
Table 4. Acquisitions and Growth in Employment. 




  OLS  Fixed effect  Fixed effect  Fixed effect 




































































































Note: a constant is included in all estimations. Energy, Inputs and Productivity are in log form. 
T- values based on robust (cluster at plant level) standard deviations are in parentheses. 
Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level.   25 
 
Table 5. Acquisitions and Growth in Employment in Different Time Periods, 
Fixed Effects (Only Acquired Plants) 
   1975-1985  1986-1996  1997-2005 
Foreign Acquis.  -0.002  0.174***  0.125*** 
   (0.118)  (0.048)  (0.029) 
Domestic Acquis.  -0.037  0.008  0.001 
   (0.040)  (0.041)  (0.035) 
Size (t-1)  -0.505***  -0.551***  -0.654*** 
   (0.061)  (0.030)  (0.024) 
Energy (t-1)  -0.002  0.007  0.013*** 
   (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.005) 
Inputs (t-1)  0.032*  0.004  -0.000 
   (0.018)  (0.009)  (0.006) 
Time dumm.  Estimated  Estimated  Estimated 
R-square  0.28  0.35  0.36 
No. of obs.  1,644  5,459  7,483 
Note: Only plants with one takeover either foreign or domestic, are used,. A constant is included 
in all estimations. Size, Energy and Inputs are in log form. Standard errors clustered at plant level. 
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Table 6. Estimated Effects of Takeovers on Employment Growth Rates After 
Takeover, Propensity Score Matching 
  
Foreign Takeover            
(Control: Always 
Domestic)    
Domestic Takeover            
(Control: Always 
Foreign) 
DD  Std. Err.    DD  Std. Err. 
Acquisition year  0.304***  (0.052)    -0.001  (0.060) 
One year after acquisition  0.044  (0.039)    -0.007  (0.038) 
Two year after acquisition  0.003  (0.038)    0.001  (0.051) 
Average of post-acquisition  0.103***  (0.029)     0.024  (0.037) 
 
 
Table 7. Estimated Effects of Takeovers on Employment Growth After 
Takeover, Propensity Score Matching 
  
Foreign Takeover            
(Control: Always 
Domestic)    
Domestic Takeover            
(Control: Always 
Foreign) 
DD  Std. Err.    DD  Std. Err. 
Acquisition year  145**  (58.5)    1  (26.4) 
One year after acquisition  188***  (62.0)    -11  (34.5) 
Two year after acquisition  250***  (60.7)    -60  (37.8) 
Average of post-acquisition  181***  (55.0)     -25  (32.5) 
Note: 
1.  For foreign takeovers, the average number of years after acquisition for both treated 
and control group is approximately 6 years. For domestic takeovers, both treated and 
control groups have on average 6 years after acquisition. 
2.  The pre-acquisition for this calculation uses information at one year before 
acquisition. It would not change the story if the average from all the years before 
acquisition is used instead. 
3.  Standard errors are bootstrapped. 
 















Age  -0.146***  -0.054*** 
  [0.007]  [0.013] 
Age Squared  0.003***  0.002*** 
  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Employment  0.592***  -0.454*** 
  [0.076]  [0.152] 
Employment Squared  -0.035***  0.022 
  [0.007]  [0.014] 
Ratio of White-collar Workers  0.630***  -0.842*** 
  [0.078]  [0.171] 
Inputs  0.014  -0.053*** 
  [0.010]  [0.017] 
Energy  0.022***  -0.021 
  [0.008]  [0.015] 
Productivity Before Acquisition
1  0.092***  -0.101*** 
  [0.015]  [0.020] 
Year Fixed Effects  Y  Y 
# of Observations  221,062  9,416 
Chi-squared  1,318  349 
Pseudo R-squared  0.1751  0.1112 



















Table A2. Balancing Property Test for Difference in Means, Foreign Takeover 












Age  Unmatched Sample  6.13  11.68  -23.36  0.00 
  Matched Sample  9.05  8.77  0.75  0.46 
Age squared  Unmatched Sample  69.46  188.67  -17.33  0.00 
  Matched Sample  121.43  120.60  0.07  0.94 
Employment   Unmatched Sample  5.01  4.18  21.83  0.00 
  Matched Sample  4.99  4.89  1.24  0.22 
Employment squared  Unmatched Sample  26.66  18.83  21.07  0.00 
  Matched Sample  26.49  25.61  0.99  0.32 
Ratio of white-collar workers  Unmatched Sample  0.21  0.15  11.69  0.00 
  Matched Sample  0.22  0.21  0.98  0.33 
Inputs   Unmatched Sample  10.23  9.40  15.34  0.00 
  Matched Sample  10.12  10.15  -0.23  0.82 
Energy   Unmatched Sample  7.62  6.66  14.66  0.00 
  Matched Sample  7.46  7.42  0.34  0.74 
Productivity before acquisition  Unmatched Sample  9.99  9.13  22.72  0.00 
   Matched Sample  9.99  9.99  -0.03  0.97 
 
 
Table A3. Balancing Property Test for Difference in Means, Domestic Takeover 












Age  Unmatched Sample  7.71  9.80  -7.07  0.00 
  Matched Sample  10.54  9.81  1.43  0.15 
Age squared  Unmatched Sample  100.46  142.09  -5.13  0.00 
  Matched Sample  156.23  137.95  1.21  0.23 
Employment   Unmatched Sample  4.98  5.49  -9.83  0.00 
  Matched Sample  5.27  5.38  -1.65  0.10 
Employment squared  Unmatched Sample  26.21  31.59  -9.06  0.00 
  Matched Sample  29.08  30.39  -1.78  0.08 
Ratio of white-collar workers  Unmatched Sample  0.20  0.24  -5.06  0.00 
  Matched Sample  0.21  0.20  1.28  0.20 
Inputs   Unmatched Sample  10.27  10.96  -9.64  0.00 
  Matched Sample  10.58  10.66  -0.85  0.40 
Energy   Unmatched Sample  7.66  8.12  -5.82  0.00 
  Matched Sample  7.96  8.13  -1.30  0.20 
Productivity before acquisition  Unmatched Sample  9.94  10.64  -11.53  0.00 
   Matched Sample  10.18  10.30  -1.45  0.15 
 
 